NeuroEthics

admin September 6, 2017

Abstract
This ambitious book aims to make a substantive contribution to six separate debates within neuroethics — the existence of free will, the impact of cognitive enhancement and (separately) of memory management on personal identity, the nature of mental privacy, the supposed subjectivity of pain, and the proper definition of death — all in the context of a framing argument concerning the relation between common sense psychological concepts and scientific concepts.… Read More...

admin September 6, 2017

Abstract
This paper critically discusses the argument from objectification – as recently presented by Elizabeth Shaw – against mandatory direct brain interventions (DBIs) targeting criminal offenders’ values as part of rehabilitative or reformative schemes. Shaw contends that such DBIs would objectify offenders because a DBI “excludes offenders by portraying them as a group to whom we need not listen” and “implies that offenders are radically defective with regard to one of the most fundamental aspects of their agency” (Shaw Criminal Law and Philosophy 8:1–20, 1).… Read More...

admin September 6, 2017

Abstract
In opposition to what we claimed in Unfit for the Future, Jan Christoph Bublitz argues that people have a right to privacy which stands in the way of the use of biomedical moral enhancement. We reply that it is not clear that he has understood what we mean by a right to privacy, that we were speaking of moral and not a legal right to privacy, and that we take a moral right to privacy to be a right against others that they don’t acquire (and sustain) certain (true) beliefs about us.… Read More...

admin September 6, 2017

Abstract
We argued in Unfit for the Future that moral enhancement – which might include biomedical moral enhancement – is necessary to solve the coordination problem presented by the amelioration of anthropogenic climate change. Stefan Schlag contends that this proposal is self-defeating because the implementation of biomedical moral enhancement poses the same problems as combatting climate change.… Read More...

admin September 6, 2017

Abstract
This paper explores the impacts of neurological intervention on selfhood with reference to recipients’ claims about changes to their self-understanding following Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) for treatment of Parkinson’s Disease. In the neuroethics literature, patients’ claims such as: “I don’t feel like myself anymore” and “I feel like a machine”, are often understood as expressing threats to identity.… Read More...

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